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*

Defendant-Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action in Divorce, arising from defendantrespondent's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce,
seeking custody of the minor child, Cody, age, five years old.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable Judge Dean E. Conder of the Third District
Court, having made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
entered an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, changing
custody of the minor child from mother to the father.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant-mother seeks reversal of said modification,
and requests that custody of her child be returned to her.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties disagree on several points in their statement
of facts. Respondent's brief states that he had "custody"
of the minor child prior to the entry of the Decree of
Divorce, and from April 1984 until February 1985. Such
statements are incorrect in that the term"custody" implies
possession, care and control of a child pursuant to an Order
of the Court.
Prior to May of 1984 there was no court Order of custody
of this child. From

May

of 1984 until February of 1985

appellant-mother did in fact have legal custody of the child
pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. Therefore, respondent's
claim of having "custody" for these periods are simply untrue,
misleading, and a misrepresentation of the actual circumstances.
Respondent's brief incorrectly states that appellant-mother's
last move was to the state of California (p.2 of respondent's
brief). The correct statement of fact is that appellant-mother's
last move was back to the state of Utah to West Valley City,
where she has now resided since April of 1985.
Appellant-mother's husband did not state (as claimed by
respondent, p. 2) that he wanted respondent-father to take
custody of the child. His actual statement from the transcript
(p. 35, L11-13) was:
"I wanted him to take him when me and Denise
had a honeymoon, to take Cody for a month, is
what I said."
Appellant-mother's husband never requested that there be

an actual change in custody of the child.
Respondent's brief refers in several places to
appellant-mother's use of cocaine (respondent's brief p. 2,
3, 6, 9 ) . A review of the transcript shows that the only
evidence or reference to use of cocaine was that she used
it "once or twice, years ago" (Transcript p. 85,L25). In
fact, the only time she tried it was with respondent-father
before the child Cody was ever born.
There was no evidence that even suggested the use of
cocaine after the child was born, or after the entry of the
Decree of Divorce. Respondent's repetitive

reference to

appellant's cocaine use is inappropriate, without basis
in fact, and is highly prejudicial.
Respondent-father's claim of having established that
he had possession of the child a majority of the time, is
untrue. Even the Trial Court did not make a finding as to
which party had possession of the child a majority of the
time,as this was a highly disputed issue in this matter, and
in its remarks the Court stated (Transcript p. 98) as follows:
"The evidence is very contradictory as to who Cody
was actually living with. You say he was living with you
during that time and she says no, he was living with me.
This one says no, he was living with her, and they say no,
he was living with you and you say Judge, in your great
wisdom, tell us whicli one of these two, where he was actually
living with. That's difficult to do."
Even the Findings of Fact do not state which parent
had possession of the child a majority of the time.
-3-

ARGUMENT
I. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT
OF A SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.
The prevailing rule of law on the issue of changing
prior order of custody of minor children is set forth
in the case of Hogge v. Hogge, 649 Pac 2d 51 (Utah 1982).
The Supreme Court in that case set forth the requirement
of a two-step procedure in modifying a prior custody order.
The first step requires a finding that a "substantial" and
"material" change of circumstance must have occured "since
time of previous decree" to warrant a change in custody. If
such a findings is made then the second step is to make a
determination,de novo/ as to custody based on the best interests
of the child.
Respondent relies on three claimed changes in circumstances
throughout his brief, as follows:
A. POSSESSION OF THE CHILD. Respondent-father claims
he had possession of the child a majority of the time before
the decree of divorce was entered, therefore, his objection
to the mother being awarded custody should have been pursued
prior to entry of the original decree. He voluntarily agreed
that mother should have custody of the child prior to the
entry of the decree, and therefore that issue is now res judicata,
and can not be modified as he has not shown a "substantial" and
"material" change in circumstances since the entry of the decree
on that basis,
-4-

B. APPELLANT MOTHER'S CHANGE OF RESIDENCE. There is
evidence that appellant-mother moved several times. However
there is no evidence that these moves were detrimental in
any way to her ability to care for the child, or had any
effect on the child's well-being. It is only reasonable that
a person who has moved out of a marital home, been single for
a while, and remarries is going to have a change in residence.
There was no evidence as to how may times appellant-mother
moved prior to the entry of the divorce decree, and how may
times she moved after entry of the decree. Therefore, again
there is no showing that this change of residence was a
"substantial" and "material" change in circumstance, and
the issue is now res judicata. Respondent-father should have
raised this issued prior to the entry of the original decree.
C. COCAINE USE. As stated previously, the only evidence
as to the use of cocaine was that appellant-mother had tried
it "once or twice, years ago". There is absolutely no evidence
that any cocaine use took place after the entry of the decree.
Therefore, this basis for claim of changed circumstances is
also without merit.
The trial court therefore, abused its discretion in finding
a change of circumstances. Respondent-father simply did not
meet his burden of proof, as there was no real basis for
a finding of a change in circumstances since the decree of
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divorce was entered.
II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A FINDING THAT IT IS IN
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD TO BE IN THE CUSTODY OF
RESPONDENT-FATHER.
In making a determination on the second step of the
change in custody process, the Court must look to what is
reasonable and necessary for the best interests of the child.
The factors to be considered are set forth in Hutchinson vs.
Hutchinson, 649 Pac 2d 38, and it is doubtful that the trial
court considered those guidelines in making its decision.
In fact, the trial court felt that this was not a clear
cut case and obviously had somtserious doubts about its
decision in this matter, stating in the memorandum decision:
"The Court has agonized long and hard as to
what will be best for Cody".
However, the trial court did find that both parties were
adequate parents, and in view of the guidelines set forth
in Hutchinson, supra, it is clear that a change in the prior
custody order was an abuse of discretion.
The following factors weigh heavily in showing that
the best interests of the child would more readily be served
by appellant-mother retaining custody of the child:
A. The child has a strong bond with both parents.
B. Appellant-mother is at home during the day and
can provide personal care for the child.
C. Respondent-father works long hours and must
hire surrogate care for the child.

D. Mother is married, has a stable marital relationship,
and can provide a normal family situation for the child,
E. Father remains single, and can not provide the
child with a stable family unit.
F. T h e child is only five years old, an age where
he is still in need of the care and nurturing of his mother.
The appellant-mother's only flaw, if it can be
considered a flaw, was to allow respondent-father liberal
visitation with her son. The evidence shows that she tried
to act reasonably in regard to visitation so that father and
son could maintain their relationship, while she maintained
the care and custody of the child. In fact, she unknowingly
had all along created the ideal custodial parent situation
which Judge Conder described in his closing statements to
the parties from the bench, as follows:
"I would like to see Cody grow up to know both of
you as his parents. The ideal situation would be to have
it so that if Cody wanted to go and visit you, Frank, this
afternoon, he could hop on the bus, or if he went down into
the neighborhood and went where he was and he would see Frank.
If he wanted to spend tomorrow with Denise because she was
going to do something, he would do that. He should grow up
feeling that you two are his parents. And he has the right
to go in your home just as he had it before. He's your child
and he's free to come and go to your home as your child."
(Transcript p.98 L19 - p.99 L4)
It seems that the mother's willingness to cooperate
with her ex-husband with liberal visitation is being used
against her in this matter, which is highly inequitable, both
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to appellant-mother and to the child.
There was no showing that the liberal visitation rights
which respondent-father enjoyed decreased the child's bond
with his mother, or reduced the mother's ability to parent
her only child. On the contrary, it shows her ability to
act rationally and with maturity in the area of visitation,
an area which is all too commonly used by custodial parents
in an attempt to spite an ex-spouse. Appellant-mother should
be commended for encouraging the father-son relationship,
while maintaining her care and custody of the child, and
not have this attribute used against her in this matter.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that respondent's interpretation of
the facts and the arguments, as applied to this case, unduly
misrepresent the true situation of the parties and the minor
child who is the subject of this action.
In his Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce,
it is respondent-father's burden to prove that a "substantial"
and "material" change of circumstances occured after entry of
the Decree of Divorce (May 1984), and that it is in the best
interests of the child that the prior custody order by changed.
The record shows that respondent-father simply did not
meet his burden of proof in this matter, and the Court abused
its discretion by ordering a change of custody without basis

as required by this Supreme Court in the rules of law set
forth in Hogge vs. Hogge, supra, and Hutchinson vs. Hutchinson,
supra*
Appellant-mother respectfully requests that the trial
courts Order Modifying Decree of Divorce be reversed, and
that she be allowed to retain custody of her only child, Cody.

Respectfully submitted,

CATHRYN JAMSON JU0D/
Attorney for Appellant
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